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21. INTRODUCTION
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was born on October 23,
2001, in Abuja, Nigeria.  The Implementation Committee of Heads of State, chaired by
President Obasanjo of Nigeria, adopted the revised NEPAD document (October 2001 edition)
as the original text “embodying the philosophy, priorities and implementation modalities of
the Initiative.”  The name of the initiative, hitherto called the New African Initiative (NAI)
was changed to NEPAD.
NEPAD will rapidly be given an institutional structure and resources, with a secretariat
located in Pretoria, South Africa. According to the communiqué released after the inaugural
meeting of the Implementation Committee, preparations are under way to develop specific
programs and projects, and to develop proposals for a conference on financing NEPAD, to be
held in Dakar, Senegal, in January 2002.
This commentary attempts to advance the discussion on NEPAD by proposing a
framework in which such regional initiatives might be assessed, with the twin guiding
principles of (i) comparative advantage (ii) poverty reduction.  That the NEPAD is a regional
initiative, and that its objective is poverty reduction, is made abundantly clear in the opening
line of the NEPAD document: “This new African initiative is a pledge by African leaders,
based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to
eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of
sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world
economy and body politic.”  It is hoped that the framework presented here will be useful as
NEPAD is refined through debate and discussion, and through the lessons of implementation.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a rapid overview of
the key elements of NEPAD to give a flavor of the nature of the initiative.  Section 3 then
presents an initial commentary, highlighting the main strengths of NEPAD and the challenges
it faces in the way it has been conceptualized. Section 4 offers a framework for assessing
NEPAD in terms of the twin guiding principles and their operation in four domains of
policy—global, regional, national and local. Section 5 applies this framework in illustrative
manner to some of the actions proposed under NEPAD. Section 6 concludes the commentary.
32. THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF NEPAD
The basic document of NEPAD derives from an earlier document, “A New African
Initiative (NAI)”, itself a merger of two parent documents, “The Millennium Partnership for
the African Recovery Programme (MAP)”, and the “Omega Plan.”  The NEPAD document
starts with three opening sections which introduce the document, and set the stage by
reviewing the place of Africa in today’s world, and stating the new political will and resolve
of African leaders in the context of the spread of democracy.  It then moves rapidly to set out
the strategy, to a discussion of programmes of action, and to an implementation plan.
As stated in the NEPAD document, the African “Strategy for Achieving Sustainable
Development in the 21st Century,” has the following structure:
 Conditions for Sustainable Development
A1. Peace, Security, Democracy and Political governance
A2. Economic and Corporate Governance
A3. Sub-regional and Regional Approaches to Development
A. Sectoral Priorities
B1. Infrastructure
B2. Human Resource Development
B3. Agriculture
B4. Environment
B5. Culture
B6. Science and Technology Platforms
B. Mobilizing Resources
C1. Capital Flows
C2. Market Access
The Programme of Action picks up the themes and develops them, but the discussion is
at a fairly general level.  As an illustration, the actions proposed under Economic and
Corporate Governance are as follows:
· A Task team from Ministries of Finance and Central banks will be
commissioned to review economic and corporate governance practices in the
various countries and regions, and make recommendations on appropriate
standards and codes of good practice for consideration by the Heads of State
Implementation Committee within six months.
4· The Implementation Committee will refer its recommendation to African states
for implementation.
· The Implementation Committee will give high priority to public financial
management.  Countries will develop a programme for improving public and
financial management and targets, and assessment mechanisms will also be set.
· The Heads of State Implementation Committee will mobilize resources for
capacity building to enable all countries to comply with the mutually agreed
minimum standards of codes of good practice.
Under Sectoral Priorities, Human Resource Development, for example, is further
divided into three sub initiatives: Poverty Reduction, Education, Reversing the Brain Drain,
and Health.  The actions under Poverty Reduction are stated as follows:
· Require that country plans prepared for initiatives in this programme of action
assess their poverty reduction impact, both before and after implementation.
· Work with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
United Nations (UN) agencies to accelerate implementation and adoption of
the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty Reduction Strategy
and related approaches.
· Establish a gender task team to ensure that the specific issues faced by poor
women are addressed in the poverty reduction strategies, of the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development.
· Establish a task team to accelerate the adoption of participatory and
decentralized processes for the provision on infrastructural and social services.
As another illustration of the sub-sectoral strategy, here are the actions under the
Information and Communications Technology Initiative, which falls under Infrastructure:
· Work with regional agencies such as the African Telecommunications Union
and Africa Connection to design model policy legislation for
telecommunications reform, and protocols and templates for e-readiness
assessments.
· Work with the regional agencies to build regulatory capacity.
· Establish a network of training and research institutions to build high-level
manpower.
· Promote and accelerate existing projects to connect schools and youth centres.
· Work with development finance institutions in Africa, multilateral initiatives
(G-8 DotForce, UN Task Force) and bilateral donors to establish financial
mechanisms to mitigate and reduce sector risks.
5The Mobilizing Resources part of the strategy is subdivided into the Capital Flows
Initiative—which is further subdivided into increasing domestic resource mobilization, debt
relief, ODA reform and private capital flows—and Market Access.  As a final example that
gives a flavor of the content of the NEPAD document, the actions under the Private Capital
Flows Initiative are:
· Establish a task team to a carry out audits of investment-related legislation and
regulation, and with a view to risk reduction and harmonization within Africa.
· Carry out a needs assessment of and feasibility study on financial instruments
to mitigate risks associated with doing business in Africa.
· Establish an initiative to enhance the capacity of countries to establish PPPs.
· Establish a Financial Market Integration Task Force that will serve to fast-track
financial market integration through the establishment of an internationally
competitive legislative and regulatory framework and the creation of a single
African trading platform.
· Additional debt relief and ODA.
The above brief illustrations of the content of the NEPAD should give a sense of how it
is conceptualized and structured, the range of issues it covers, and the level of specifics in it.
We turn now to an initial commentary on the document.
3. AN INITIAL VIEW
The NEPAD initiative is to be welcomed wholeheartedly.  While recognizing the
historical and colonial roots of African underdevelopment, NEPAD argues that Africa’s future
is in its own hands—“the hopes of Africa’s peoples for a better life can no longer rest on the
magnanimity of others.”  It candidly recognizes that past attempts “to set out continent-wide
development programmes” have not succeeded, in part because of “questionable leadership
and ownership by Africans themselves.”  It welcomes the fact that “across the continent,
democracy is spreading, backed by the African Union (AU), which has shown a new resolve
to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the norm.”  It states clearly that “The New
Partnership for Africa’s Development has, as one of its foundations, the expansion of
democratic frontiers and the deepening of the culture of human rights.”  Finally, while the
financial importance of concessional external resources is recognized, it is done so in the
framework of partnership between equals.
6These overarching features of NEPAD, in particular its strong emphasis on democracy
and governance, do indeed make it different from past attempts at fashioning Africa-wide
initiatives for African development.  However, it shares other features with past efforts that
are perhaps inevitable in a wide-ranging document.  Two related characteristics that stand out
are its broad spread and the level of generality at which actions are discussed.  Thus the
document declares that
 “African leaders will take joint responsibility for the following:
-Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the
sub-regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore
and maintain peace;
-Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries
and regions, and by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and
participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels;
-Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing
appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate
institutional framework to achieve these standards;
-Instituting legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of
private companies and the public sector;
-Revitalising and extend the provision of educational, technical training and health
services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable
diseases;
-Promoting the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing
their capacity in the domains of education and training; by the development of revenue-
generating activities through facilitating access to credit; and by assuring their participation in
the political and economic life of African countries;
-Building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as
well as maintaining law and order;
-Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification into
agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export markets.”
This list should give some idea of the scope envisaged for NEPAD.  The generality of
the actions under each program or initiative has already been suggested in the previous
section.  Yet it can be argued that such a characterization is unfair, for two reasons.  First, an
7Africa-wide program such as NEPAD is bound to be general in nature.  The continent’s
problems are themselves broad and interlinked. Second, the document does in fact suggest
prioritization.  It does so implicitly by the order in which the key issues are listed—conflict
prevention, democracy and governance are clearly seen as being of primary importance.  Also,
in the concluding sections, the document does discuss immediate priorities and “fast-
tracking”:
“Recognising the need to sequence and prioritize, the initiating Presidents propose that
the following programmes be fast-tracked, in collaboration with development partners:
(a) Communicable diseases—HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis;
(b) Information and Communications Technology;
(c) Debt reduction;
(d) Market access.”
However, it is not clear how exactly these or other priorities are developed, and it is
equally not clear how to evaluate specific actions within each of the priority areas.  As the
discussion of NEPAD develops, as it moves into the implementation phase, and as demands
on its limited resources multiply, there will need to be a framework in which priorities and
specifics are assessed. The next section offers a particular framework to initiate the debate.
4. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, POVERTY AND THE FOUR DOMAINS OF
POLICY
How is one to prioritize among the large number of actions and interventions that could
potentially fall under the rubric of NEPAD? This section considers two governing principles:
the comparative advantage of NEPAD in carrying out specific actions, and the impact of those
actions on poverty.
The comparative advantage of NEPAD stems directly from its origins and status as a
Regional institution with roots in African democracies.  These twin features determine the
level at which the institution is most likely to be effective, and the issues on which it is likely
to have greatest credibility.  Thus issues for which an Africa wide perspective emanating from
democratically elected African leaders is essential, are likely to be the issues on which
8NEPAD has a comparative advantage relative to the many other institutional arrangements
which already exist in Africa.
On poverty, it is suggested here that direct versus indirect impacts of actions is a useful
distinction.  Relatedly, short run versus long run consequence for poverty is another useful
categorization.  There are many actions which reduce poverty indirectly and in the long run,
as the economy as a whole develops and prospers.  Infrastructure investment that promotes
high technology manufacturing, is an example of this.  And there are actions that can have a
faster and more direct beneficial effect on the poor.  Direct investment in health facilities in
poor areas, or the development of an effective anti-malaria vaccine, are examples of this.
There may also be tradeoffs.  Actions and interventions which lead to long-term development
and poverty reduction may nevertheless have short-term adverse consequences for some of the
poor.  Infrastructure investment like dams, or some forms of trade liberalization, provide
examples of these painful tradeoffs.  Everything else being equal, the position taken here is
that actions which have most direct and beneficial impacts on poverty should be prioritized.
To illustrate the operation of these two principles, the framework  can be further
developed by considering four domains of the operation of policy and of its impact—Global,
Regional, National and Local.
By the global domain is meant the constellation of policies and impacts at the level
above the region, and where decisions are, or ought to be, made at the global level. Global
warming, the Law of the Seas, international financial architecture, research into malaria
vaccine, and WTO are examples of issues that fall under this category.  The regional domain
is Africa-wide.  Africa’s trade preferences with the EU, or Africa’s response to the US
African Growth and Opportunity Act, cross-national issues within Africa like water rights or
infrastructure, or regional trade agreements and, most crucially, peace and security within
Africa, are all in the regional domain.  The national domain is the one most commonly
discussed—exchange rate policies, sound public finances, trade liberalization, privatization,
the budget for education and health, a well functioning legal system, democratic governance
and a free press are all examples of levers that operate essentially at the national level.
Finally, the local level is sub-national, going right down to the community, the household and
the individual.  Household decisions such as sending girl children to school, choosing cash
crops versus food crops, or community decisions such as how much labor to contribute to
9repairing culverts, or on how to manage common property resources such as fish ponds or
wood lots, are examples of the issues that define the local domain.
Of course, like any classification, the Global-Regional-National-Local (GRNL)
framework is not completely tight and well defined.  Thus, for example, the regional domain
includes strictly region-wide issues as well as issues which may be more properly classified as
sub-regional—indeed, Africa has many sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS or
SADC.  In the GRNL framework these are all subsumed under R. Similarly, as noted above,
the local domain stretches from the nation, through sub-national entities, to local communities
to households and individuals.  There are overlaps as well.  For example, while the operations
of WTO can be classified under the global realm, if Africa were to take a unified stance on a
negotiating position that would be a regional level decision but one with a global impact as
well as an impact on the region.  Similarly, local communities and organization do not operate
independently of the national legal structure, so the L and N domains overlap and interact.
These overlaps and interactions across the GRNL domains will have to be kept in mind, and
indeed will be an interesting part of the analysis.  But ultimately the framework’s usefulness
will have to be judged in terms of the insights it provides in structuring discourse on NEPAD
and poverty.
The basic definitions and characterizations of poverty all fall in the local domain.  This
is not the place to review the huge and evolving literature on the conceptualization and
measurement of poverty.  The last quarter century has seen a progressive broadening of the
characterization from low income to inadequate achievements in education, health and
nutrition.  Most recently, the additional conceptualization of poverty as vulnerability (to
events outside the control of the individual or the community) and voicelessness (in the face
of unresponsive local and national institutions) has also entered the discourse.  But all of these
focus on the individual, the household or the community.  The moral weight of the concept of
poverty comes from its direct link to human beings and their well-being, rather than the state
of larger entities and statistical abstractions.  The ultimate focus of policy in the global,
regional and national domains must therefore always be its impact, directly or indirectly, on
the poor at the local level.
The issue of direct and indirect impacts also cuts across the GRNL classification.
Policies and forces at the global level can impact the poor directly, or indirectly through their
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consequences for the regional or national level.  For example, an international breakthrough in
developing a vaccine for malaria has the potential for a direct impact on the well being of the
poor in Africa.  But an international financial architecture which leads to a more stable global
trade and payments system will work more indirectly, hopefully through stimulating
economic growth at the regional and national levels.  Similarly, cross-regional cooperation on
river blindness has had major direct impact on the health of Africa’s poor at the local level.
Agreements that bring peace and security to war torn countries have a direct consequence for
the poor.  But they also have an indirect effect as the stability lays the basis for national
economic growth.  For those countries not mired in civil war, national level policy such as the
sectoral composition of public expenditure—for example, whether it is targeted towards poor
regions and poor households—is a key determinant of poverty impact.  Macroeconomic and
trade policy works more indirectly, by creating the environment for private investment and
growth.  At the same time, some macroeconomic and trade policies at the national level, while
promoting growth and poverty reduction in the medium term, may have short-term adverse
consequences for the poor.
As noted earlier, NEPAD’s comparative advantage is that it is a regional institution
speaking with an authority rooted in democratically elected governments.  Its regional
character locates it squarely in the R domain of our four-fold classification.  It follows that its
natural niche is in policies and interventions that apply in the regional domain, and those in
other domains for which having a united African voice is particularly important.  Examples
that come to mind are (i) regional peace and security initiatives (R), (ii) regional level
infrastructure or environmental investments  (R), (iii) a united African position on
international financial architecture, WTO and debt relief (G), (iv) pressing for global research
on tropical diseases (G), (v) peer monitoring and pressure on governance and rule of law in
African nations (N) and  (vi) establishing and pushing for “best practice” standards in public
expenditure management (N).  However, while all of these examples make use of NEPAD’s
regional nature, only a few of them benefit particularly strongly from the second feature of
NEPAD—its credibility as an initiative in which democratic governance is “one of the
foundations.”  Of the examples given above, it can be argued that only (i) and (v) make
particularly strong use of the democratic basis of NEPAD.
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Moreover, each action with an impact in the R, G or N domain, which is where
NEPAD’s actions are likely to be most effective, has also to be assessed for its efficacy for
poverty reduction—directly, and indirectly.  Thus, for example, regional peace and security
has a direct  and immediate impact on the wellbeing of the poor since they are the ones most
negatively affected by insecurity.  It also has an indirect and medium term effect because
security establishes the conditions for investment and growth.  Relatedly, once basic peace
and security is in place, the legal and police system, and governance more generally, has an
immediate impact on the lives of the poor, as well as improving the climate for private sector
investment for medium term growth.  The same is true, in the G domain, of global
investments in vaccine research, or international debt relief (although for both of these to
work national level governance has to be appropriate).  However, regional level infrastructure
investments, while crucial from the medium term point of view, may only have minor effects
on poverty in the short term.  Similarly, improving the global climate for investment,
important over the medium term for global growth and hence growth in Africa, may not pay
immediate dividends for the poor.
The above illustrative discussion suggests three key questions that should be asked of
any set of actions or program proposed under the NEPAD umbrella, as an aid to establishing
priorities:
(i) Is the program particularly well suited to a regional organization,
and are there not other regional organizations that are already doing
it reasonably well?
(ii) Is the program particularly well suited to a regional organization
that is rooted in democratic values?
(iii) Does the program combine both direct and indirect benefits to the
poor?
Programs and actions which score high on these criteria should be prioritized.  The next
section illustrates the application of these criteria by considering individual actions discussed
in the NEPAD document.
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5. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
We now proceed to an evaluation of the actions proposed in the NEPAD document.  The
evaluation will be illustrative rather than comprehensive, since the actions in the NEPAD
document are themselves meant to be initial statements for further elaboration and discussion.
The broad structure of the NEPAD proposals has been outlined in Section 2.  It should
be clear from the discussion above that the proposals under A1, the Peace and Security
Initiative, score very highly on all three criteria set out. Actions are envisaged in four areas:
“prevention, management and resolution of conflict; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace
enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and combating
illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.”  While there is room for
discussion on specifics, the actions proposed are clearly regional, they are clearly well suited
to an organization emanating from democratic governments, and their direct and indirect
impacts on poverty reduction are significant.  It is encouraging, therefore, that the NEPAD
document notes that “The leadership of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development will
consider, within six months of its establishment, setting out detailed and costed measures in
each of the four areas above.  The exercise will also include actions required of partners, and
the nature and sources of financing such activities.”
The same is true of key actions under the Democracy and Political Governance
Initiative.  These consist of: “a series of commitments by participating countries to create or
consolidate basic governance processes and practices; an undertaking by participating
countries to take the lead in supporting initiatives that foster good governance; and the
institutionalization of commitments through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
leadership to ensure that the core values of the initiative are bided by.”  Again, there is room
for discussion and perhaps disagreement on specifics, but at this level of generality these
actions score high on all three criteria.
But consider now actions under A2, the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative,
which were laid out in Section 2 as an illustration of the details in the NEPAD document.
While there are clearly some regional dimensions of these actions, and while it is clear that
good economic management is the sine qua non of medium term growth and poverty
reduction, it is not immediately obvious that the actions listed are particularly suited to
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NEPAD’s comparative advantage, nor that many of them might not be better carried out by
other organizations such as the African Development Bank.  It is also not clear how country
specific agreements with the IFIs will interact with these region wide initiatives in economic
management.  At the very least, it would seem that some further debate and discussion is
needed before a top priority is put on this for allocation of NEPAD’s scarce resources.
Under A3, Sub-Regional and Regional approaches to development, the NEPAD
document broaches actions that overlap with actions under other headings as well, but
covering “Regional Public Goods”:
“The New Partnership for Africa’s Development focuses on the provision essential
regional public goods (such as transport, energy, water, ICT, disease eradication,
environmental preservation, and provision of regional research capacity), as well as promotion
of intra-African trade and investments.”
While regional public goods clearly fit into the R domain of NEPAD’s comparative
advantage, and thus score high on the first criterion, questions remain on (i) are there other
regional organizations that are doing the job? and (ii) which of these regional public goods has
a significant effect on poverty through combining positive direct and indirect impacts?  Of the
examples mentioned in the quote above, regional research capacity is perhaps best left to the
African Development Bank, and the NEPAD document recognizes this.  There are also, of
course, numerous sub-regional organizations for coordinating transport and trade issues.
Duplication of these efforts should be avoided.  On poverty, regional efforts at vector borne
disease eradication would clearly score higher on direct impact than, for example, regional
transport initiatives.  All of these factors must be borne in mind when prioritizing between
such regional public goods.
Under Sectoral priorities, NEPAD discusses a wide array of actions, all of which would
be beneficial to African development but only some of which are particularly well suited to
NEPAD’s comparative advantage, and would be of major immediate benefit to the poor.
Rather than go through each of the actions in detail, we will merely take some examples to
illustrate the application of the criteria above.
Consider, for example, the array of actions under “Investing in Information and
Communication Technologies,” which are listed in Section 2.  The first action is to “work
with regional agencies such as the African Telecommunications Union and Africa Connection
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to design model policy and legislation for telecommunications reform, and protocols and
templates for e-readiness assessment.”  Since this is an area where other regional agencies are
already working, the issues of NEPAD’s involvement must be scrutinized carefully to assess
its priority.  The second and third actions,  “work with regional agencies to build regulatory
capacity,” and “establish a network of training and research institutions to build high-level
manpower,” are not specified in sufficient detail for evaluation.  They are of course in
principle plausible for a regional institution to take up.  But, (i) there are other regional
agencies dedicated to these tasks, (ii) it is not clear how the democratic roots of NEPAD feed
in to them and (iii) the direct poverty impacts are not obvious, although indirect and medium
term benefits could be substantial through growth enhancing investments in ICT. The fourth
action, “promote and accelerate existing projects to connect schools and youth centers”, is
very much in the N or L domain—it is not clear that it is the comparative advantage of an
institution in the R domain to prioritize this.  Finally, the statement of the fifth action, “work
with development finance institutions in Africa, multilateral initiatives (G-8 Dotforce, UN
Task Force) and bilateral donors to establish financial mechanisms to reduce sector risks,”
itself highlights that there are other agencies already deeply involved, and does to clarify what
exactly NEPAD as an institution could bring to the table.
Many of the actions in the sectoral priorities portion of NEPAD would thus score low on
the three criteria laid out above.  But there are other actions that would indeed score highly.
For example, health is a sub-category under B2, and the following actions are envisaged under
this heading:
“-Strengthen Africa’s participation in processes aimed at procuring affordable drugs,
including those involving the international pharmaceutical companies and international civil
society, and explore the use of alternative delivery systems for essential drugs and supplies;
-Mobilise the resources required to build effective disease interventions and secure
health systems;
-Lead the campaign for increased international financial support for the struggle against
HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases;
-Join forces with other international agencies such as the WHO and donors to ensure
support for the continent is increased by at least US $10billion per annum;
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-Encourage African countries to give higher priority to health in their own budgets and
to phase such increases in expenditure to a level to be mutually determined;
-Jointly mobilize resources for capacity-building in order to enable all African countries
to improve their health infrastructure and management.”
In this list of actions there are some for which comparative advantage of NEPAD
relative to other agencies is not necessarily strong.  For example, in the second proposed
action, if the systems and interventions are primarily national it is not clear that a regional
institution has a comparative advantage raising resources for them.  Similarly, while of course
improving of health infrastructure  is to be welcomed as a general medium term goal, the sixth
action seems like a general exhortation—it is not clear that this is a leading candidate for the
scarce resources represented by NEPAD’s special comparative advantage, and there are other
agencies already working on this.
However, the first, third, fourth and sixth sets of actions listed above would score very
highly on the three criteria.  These are actions which make best use of NEPAD as a regional
entity and a credible democratic voice for Africa, where it is unlikely that other Africa-wide
agencies could be as effective, and where the direct and indirect impacts on the health of the
poor are very great.  The global debate on the prices charged by international pharmaceutical
prices for key drugs is directly crucial to the well being of millions of poor people across
Africa.  Northern governments are under pressure from their own civil societies to enact
various legislations with respect to this issue.  What Africa needs in this debate is a credible
voice that can represent all of Africa, and be representative of the people of Africa. NEPAD
fits the bill.  The allocation of resources to give NEPAD the technical support it needs in this
debate  would therefore get high marks on our criteria.  The same is true for the campaign to
increase international financial support for an attack on communicable diseases.  Moreover, it
is well known that a major problem in Africa is that African countries’ own health budgets are
highly skewed in favor of the urban rich. NEPAD’s development and operation of an Africa
wide mechanism of  mutual monitoring would draw on NEPAD's twin sources of comparative
advantage—its regional character and its roots in representative government.
Consider now the third category of actions proposed under NEPAD, Mobilising
Resources.  Some care is again needed here in separating out those actions  which are
primarily national in nature and over which NEPAD can have little influence, or which are
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best done by other regional agencies, and those actions which can truly capitalize on
NEPAD’s comparative advantage.  Let us start with C1, the Capital Flows Initiative. NEPAD,
with its special authority, can play a strong role in fashioning a case for deeper and broader
Debt Relief (a sub-category of actions under C1), while at the same time developing mutual
monitoring mechanisms for ensuring that the proceeds of debt relief do indeed find their way
directly to the poor.  This is particularly true given a perception in some quarters that  the
international debt relief initiative is stuck at too timid a level.
However, there is less of a strong case for NEPAD giving high priority to ODA issues in
general (another sub-category under C1).  It is not clear that the issue is sufficiently well
crystallized in the international domain in such a way that NEPAD could play a special role.
Other agencies such as ECA should perhaps take the lead in such issues as responses to the
PRSP framework, and the NEPAD document recognizes this.  On encouraging private capital
flows (the final sub-category under C1), the actions suggested in the NEPAD document are all
perfectly reasonable, but it is not clear that they have a priority claim on NEPAD’s  scarce
capital, and there are surely other agencies which have better technical expertise to carry out
tasks such as reviewing investment related legislation or enhancing capacity of countries to
implement PPPs.
The Market Access Initiative, C2, similarly has a mix of actions that are on the face of it
either very well suited to NEPAD’s comparative advantage and to the poverty reduction
objective, or not as well suited.  It is hard to think that NEPAD could develop sufficient
sectoral expertise, for example in mining, to achieve very specific sectoral goals.  Others, such
as “develop new industries, or upgrade existing ones, where African countries have
comparative advantages, including agro-based industries, energy and mineral resource-based
industries,” seem far too general, and in any case squarely in the national domain, to not have
a priority claim on NEPAD resources.  However, the objective that “if a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations is started, it must recognize and provide for the African
continent’s special concerns, needs and interests in future WTO rules,” is clearly one in which
NEPAD should take a lead role, supported by technical agencies.  This is because it is
important in international negotiations for Africa to speak not only with one voice but a voice
that has credibility because it represents the will of the African people through democratically
elected heads of state.
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Let us finally consider, as an application of the framework developed in this paper, the
programmes that the NEPAD document itself argues should be “fast-tracked”.  As noted
above there are four of these—Communicable Diseases, ICT, Debt Reduction and Market
Access. Of these four, the framework developed here would strongly support Communicable
Diseases and Debt Reduction as priorities for NEPAD. The three questions posed in the
criteria set out in the previous section would be answered as follows. (i) These actions are
particularly well suited to a regional organization and other regional organizations in Africa
are not doing them particularly well or at all. (ii) In making a continent wide argument for
debt reduction, in developing monitoring mechanisms and protocols for prudent use of the
proceeds of debt relief, and for presenting and defending the interests of Africa vis a vis
international pharmaceutical companies in the court of world opinion, an African organization
rooted in democratic values has a special comparative advantage. (iii) Both debt relief and
health advances in communicable diseases will have a direct beneficial impact on the well
being of the poor, as well as indirect and medium term benefits through the overall climate for
economic growth. Debt Reduction and Communicable Diseases would therefore score high on
all three criteria.  But the same is not true of ICT and Market Access.  ICT has been discussed
above.  Market Access is a very large sub-category, some components of which would not
score high but others, particularly those focusing on WTO and other specifically international
issues where a democratic voice from Africa will be effective, would indeed be prioritized in
the framework developed in this paper.
6. CONCLUSION
As the implementation of NEPAD gathers steam, there will be more demands on it than
can be satisfied—by a vast margin.  The needs of the continent are so great, the diagnosis of
the causes of African poverty are so complex and so interlinked, and the financial and
technical resources of NEPAD will be so attractive, that this is bound to be the case.  But,
apart from simple operational overload, there is a danger that in satisfying too many demands
NEPAD will squander its most precious resource—its position as a regional institution that
draws its regional and global legitimacy from its democratic roots and aspirations.  It is
suggested in this initial commentary that in the next phase of the discussion and development
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of NEPAD each proposed action or program be put to a three pronged test—whether the
action makes efficient use of NEPAD’s regional status without duplicating what other
regional agencies are already doing, whether the action particularly and peculiarly needs the
special authority of NEPAD that stems from its claim to speak for the people of Africa
through democratically elected heads of state, and whether the action will have not only a
medium term but an immediate and direct benefit to the poor of Africa.  It is hoped that these
criteria would help in prioritizing among the vast array of actions that are already suggested
and will further be suggested for NEPAD.  But a stronger hope is that as the debate develops
NEPAD will proactively generate actions and programs that are peculiarly suited to it.  If that
happens, then the framework suggested here will have been useful not simply in performing a
gatekeeper role, but may also prove useful more positively for making the most of NEPAD’s
very special strengths.
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